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Abstract Flood risk of all types of flooding is projected to
increase based on climate change projections and increases
in damage potential. These challenges are likely to aggra-
vate issues of justice in flood risk management (hereafter
FRM). Based on a discursive institutionalist perspective,
this paper explores justice in Dutch FRM: how do insti-
tutions allocate the responsibilities and costs for FRM for
different types of flooding? What are the underlying con-
ceptions of justice? What are the future challenges with
regard to climate change? The research revealed that a
dichotomy is visible in the Dutch approach to FRM:
despite an abundance of rules, regulations and resources
spent, flood risk or its management is only marginally
discussed in terms of justice. Despite that, the current
institutional arrangement has material outcomes that treat
particular groups of citizens differently, depending on the
type of flooding they are prone to, area they live in
(unembanked/embanked) or category of user (e.g. house-
hold, industry, farmer). The paper argues that the debate on
justice will (re)emerge, since the differences in distribu-
tional outcomes are likely to become increasingly uneven
as a result of increasing flood risk. The Netherlands should
be prepared for this debate by generating the relevant facts
and figures. An inclusive debate on the distribution of
burdens of FRM could contribute to more effective and
legitimate FRM.
Keywords Justice  Flood risk management  The
Netherlands  Discursive institutionalism  Discourses
Introduction
Notions of fairness, equity and justice are increasingly
being discussed in the context of environmental issues such
as climate change (e.g. Adger 2001; Ikeme 2003; Heyward
2007) and, in particular, in relation to flood risk manage-
ment (FRM) (e.g. Johnson et al. 2007; Walker and Burn-
ingham 2011). Concerns about just, fair or equitable FRM
are acknowledged by the EU Floods Directive (2007),
which states ‘The solidarity principle is very important in
the context of FRM… Member States should be encour-
aged to seek a fair sharing of responsibilities’ (Recital 15 of
the FD). However, the Directive itself does not specify the
terms solidarity or fairness, nor how these should be
operationalised (Van Eerd et al. 2015). Such an opera-
tionalisation is difficult since justice is a social construct
(Davy 1997; Martinez-Alier 2012), with different actors
attributing different meanings to who should be protected,
who should warrant this protection and who should pay for
it. Nevertheless, a consideration of these issues is
important.
Analytically, a distinction can be made between proce-
dural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice
refers to the fairness of the decision-making process. FRM
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research is plentiful with debate about adequate and
effective participation mechanisms (e.g. Nye et al. 2011;
Mees et al. 2016). The focus of this paper, however, is on
the second component: distributive justice, referring to the
distribution of both the burdens and benefits from FRM.
Despite multiple burdens of FRM being distinguished
(Penning-Rowsell and Priest 2014), this paper exams two
key issues of distributional justice. The burden of flood risk
itself, due to differing hydrological circumstances, is
inherently unevenly distributed (Johnson et al. 2007; Pen-
ning-Rowsell and Pardoe 2012). Furthermore, there is the
burden of FRM, i.e. the distribution of responsibilities and
the financing of management and recovery strategies
(Penning-Rowsell and Pardoe 2014). These burdens are
allocated through institutions responsible for managing
flood risk. Additionally, flooding is also intrinsically linked
to broader social and economic inequities which affect both
communities’ and individuals’ resilience, i.e. their ability
to prevent damage and recover from flood events. This
ability may be diminished for deprived households, single-
parent households, elderly or ethnic minorities (Walker and
Burningham 2011; Fielding 2012).
Understanding the distribution of current and future
burdens is particularly important in the context of wors-
ening flood risks. Probabilities of flooding are projected to
increase due to climate change, while consequences are
also worsening due to additional socio-economic devel-
opment in flood-prone areas (De Bruijn and Klijn 2009;
Alfieri et al. 2015). These challenges are likely to aggravate
issues of justice in FRM.
The Netherlands is an example of a highly vulnerable
delta. FRM in the Netherlands has a long tradition with a
strongly protectionist approach (Van Heezik 2006). It is
characterised by, firstly, the ambition to pre-emptively
minimise fluvial and coastal flood probabilities, resulting in
one of the most ambitious national safety standards for
defence structures in the world (Aerts et al. 2008). Sec-
ondly, the financing of this high protection level, annually
around one billion Euros, is based on a principle of col-
lective solidarity (Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). Soli-
darity implies that the risks and burdens that group
members face should be shared by the group as a whole,
that is, all inhabitants of the Netherlands (Dawson and
Verweij 2012). As such, it implies a (re)allocation of
individual flood risk burdens to the collective which is
institutionalised into FRM approaches. However, despite
the high risks present and the high level of taxes spent on
flooding issues, there is little societal or scientific debate
about the very principle of this burden sharing. Questions
that remain largely undebated include: who carries the
burden of FRM? Who is included and excluded from
benefiting from the national solidarity approach? Does, and
should, the solidarity approach extend to other types of
flooding?
Indeed, the OECD (2014: 86) has recognised this issue
and raised concerns regarding the fairness of the Dutch
solidarity approach, especially if costs for FRM escalate in
the future. This paper aims to explore distributional justice
in Dutch FRM, based upon the following research ques-
tions: (1) how do institutions in the Netherlands allocate
the responsibilities and costs for FRM and recovery for
different types of flooding? (2) What are underlying con-
ceptions of justice connected to these institutional
arrangements? and (3) What are potential challenges with
future increasing flood risks?
The second section presents conceptual approaches to
analyse institutional arrangements in terms of justice. The
methodological approach is explained in section three.
Section four describes the distribution of flood risk in the
Netherlands, while the following Section five analyses
‘Dutch flood risk management’, i.e. how institutions dis-
tribute the burdens for FRM and how the operation of the
arrangement creates different distributive justice outcomes.
Section six entitled ‘Discourses of FRM in the Nether-
lands’ studies the explicit conceptions of distributive jus-
tice underlying Dutch FRM, and finally, the last section
reflects on potential justice challenges for delivering future
Dutch FRM.
Conceptualising approaches to justice in FRM
This paper adopts a discursive institutional perspective
(e.g. Hajer 1995; Fischer 2003; Kaufmann et al. 2016).
This perspective conceptualises social constructs, such as
justice, as discourses. These discourses materialise into
institutions that have tangible consequences for all actors
by distributing the burdens of flood risk and FRM. This
paper defines discourses as ‘specific ensembles of ideas,
concepts and categorization […] through which meaning is
given to physical and social realities’ (Hajer 1995: 44).
Discourses are socially constitutive and embody power,
because they influence the way people conceive and value
certain problems and suppress alternative conceptions
(Foucault 1978). Institutions are defined as ‘the formal or
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions
embedded in the organizational structure’ (Hall and Taylor,
1996: 6). Discourses are constitutive of institutions, while
simultaneously, discourses are also constituted by the
existing institutions (Foucault 1972; Philips and Jorgensen
2002). Even though institutions reflect to some degree
particular discourses, e.g. on justice, on flood risk or on
governance, a discourse is not par for par translated in an
institution. Therefore, similar justice discourses can
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solidify differently into institutions that, thereby, distribute
the burdens for flood risk and FRM differently. Institutions
are the intermediary outcomes of an ongoing social pro-
cess. This process is influenced by the constraining and
enabling function of existing institutions (Giddens 1984). It
reflects the interaction and domination patterns between
actors that may advocate diverging discourses (Hajer
1995).
The paper makes a number of conceptual clarifications
and distinctions. The terms justice, fairness and equity are
often used interchangeably (Ikeme 2003). For the purpose
of clarity, this paper focuses on the concept of distribu-
tional justice to align it with the conceptual differentiations
of justice in the political philosophy literature (Rawls 1973;
Nozick 1974; Mill 2010; Sen 2010). Building on previous
research about distributional justice in FRM (Davy 1997;
Johnson et al. 2007; Johnson et al. 2008; Thaler and
Hartmann 2016), we distinguish four contrasting theoreti-
cal perspectives on justice (Table 1).
Elitist/libertarian justice focuses on the principle of
‘maximum liberty’. It is based on the idea that people are
entitled to what they have achieved individually due to
their merit or rank and that the government should not
intervene (Nozick 1974; Davy 1997). Regarding FRM, this
implies that the government does not carry out FRM
measures, but that everyone shall carry the burden of flood
risk and FRM on their own. This beneficiary pays approach
will lead to elitist outcomes because FRM will be depen-
dent on individual capacities, which might be limited to
certain elitist groupings. The lack of government inter-
vention also offers room for market actors, such as the
establishment of flood insurance, which introduce other
ways of spreading burdens between individuals.
Utilitarian justice is based on the principle of ‘max-
imising utility’, that is, redistributing collective resources
to achieve the maximum societal benefits (Davy 1997; Mill
2010). Collective vulnerability to flooding is valued above
individual vulnerabilities. As a consequence, if flood risk is
seen as a collective problem, the state is expected to
manage the issue by allocating collective tax income
ensuring the maximum utility for the majority. In this
conception, solidarity is not a moral obligation, but an
economic calculus. If only a minority is exposed to flood
risk, a utilitarian perspective would suggest that those ‘at
risk’ individually finance FRM as this ensures the greatest
utility for the collective majority, i.e. the tax payer.
Rawlsian ‘maximin rule’ states that: resources should be
distributed so that they favour the most vulnerable, i.e. this
principle focuses on absolute vulnerabilities (Rawls 1973;
Davy 1997). With regard to flooding, two types of vul-
nerable people can be distinguished: citizens prone to
flooding and citizens lacking resilience to flooding, for
example financially deprived households. To compensate
for the unequal distribution of flood risk, the burden of
financing FRM shall be carried by the collective based on
solidarity, in contrast to an individual beneficiary pays
approach. Taking into account individual responsibility,
Kymlicka (2002) distinguished between ‘choice sensitive
responsibilities’ (where individuals remain responsible for
past choices) and ‘endowment sensitive duties’ (assisting
those affected by uncontrollable or unforeseen conse-
quences).1 This is important for flood risk managers, who
may wish to distinguish between those who have made an
active choice to live in known high-flood-risk areas and
those who have no choice, where the risk was unknown or
has increased due to other changing circumstances.
The egalitarian principle builds on the notion of equal
opportunity for every citizen in terms of distributional
outcomes. It implies a public responsibility to provide a
certain level of safety or well-being (Davy 1997; Sen
2010), so it aligns with the idea of the ‘provident’ or
‘providing state’ (Gutmann 1988). In terms of FRM, this
could imply that those at risk of flooding should be com-
pensated for any inherent inequalities to obtain the same
opportunities as those not at flood risk, and, as such, soli-
darity-based financing of FRM. In contrast to the ‘Rawlsian
maximin rule’ perspective, it is not limited to the most
Table 1 Overview of different theoretical understandings of distributive justice
Elitist Utilitarian Rawlsian ‘maximin rule’ Egalitarian
Who is
responsible for
FRM?
Individual Major risk: collective ? state
Minor risk: individual
Collective for the most vulnerable—
mainly state
State—collective
Who is
benefitting?
Those who
can afford it
Protection for the ones that result in
highest benefit for society
The most flood-prone,
Households with a limited resilience
capacity
Everyone has same
right to protection
Who pays for
FRM?
Beneficiary
pays
Collective as long as collective
benefits exceed costs
Solidarity based for the vulnerable,
Potential individual for those not
considered to be the ‘most vulnerable’
Solidarity based
1 See also the discussion on ‘luck egalitarianism’, which is associated
with this distinction (e.g. Knight 2013).
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vulnerable, but based on the equal treatment of all citizens,
independent of their geographical location, their resilience
capacity or other factors, i.e. it focuses on relative vul-
nerabilities. Institutions shall ensure this equality principle
either by providing an equal protection level for everyone
or by ensuring that all citizens have equal capacities to
ensure their own protection.
Methodological approach and data analysis
To analyse distributional justice outcomes, the institutional
arrangement responsible for Dutch FRM is analysed using
the following concepts: rules, actors and resources (Arts
and Leroy 2006). These comprehend the formal and
informal rules (legislations, procedures and policies) that
distribute rights and responsibilities for FRM; the distri-
bution of tasks and competencies between governmental
and non-governmental actors; and resources for funding
FRM (including taxes and contributions from different
types of users). Subsequently, the underlying discourses on
justice are analysed, i.e. the conceptions of justice explic-
itly presented in policy and legal documents, or by gov-
ernmental authorities.
This paper utilises established social science method-
ologies, and mixed methods are adopted with a focus on
qualitative methods such as policy and discourse analysis
(Hajer and Versteeg 2005; Creswell 2013). Data were
collected via document analysis (e.g. policy documents,
legal texts and secondary literature), which was mainly
used to analyse the characteristics of Dutch FRM, in terms
of rules, resources and task distribution. This analysis was
supported and supplemented by 20 qualitative semi-struc-
tured interviews with policymakers and experts, which
were mainly used to analyse the discourses, including the
understandings and discussions regarding justice. The
information from these interviews is mainly paraphrased in
the text. Documents and transcripts were systematically
coded according to the conceptual framework and the
different conceptualisations of justice. Quantitative esti-
mates of risk and FRM financing were sought from a range
of sources (national ministerial datasets: e.g. Transport and
Water (V&W 2010), its successor Infrastructure and
Environment (I&M 2012, 2015); datasets of regional water
authorities (UvW 2015); and academic data sources of the
research institute COELO). These were supplemented by
the aforementioned semi-structured interviews. A distinc-
tion was made between low- and high-flood-prone areas in
the west and elevated, less-flood-prone areas in the east.
However, national spending estimates figures were often
lacking or incomplete. Therefore, approximations, expert
judgement from interviews or the best case data were used.
The lack of data is already a first indication of the absence
of justice-based discussions.
Flood risk in the Netherlands
Three types of flooding are prominent in the Nether-
lands: coastal, fluvial and, slowly emerging on the
political agenda, pluvial flooding. Apart from their
causes, they differ in their probabilities, severity and
potential impact. Importantly, climate change is pro-
jected to affect all three types of flooding by increasing
their frequency and/or intensity (De Bruijn and Klijn
2009; Klijn et al. 2012; Verbond van Verzekeraars
2015). The Netherlands is highly prone to fluvial and
coastal flooding, due to its location at the delta of four
major rivers and due to soil subsidence. A well-recited
example of this vulnerability is the storm surge of 1953,
which affected large parts of the country and killed more
than 1800 people (Van Heezik 2006). Other examples
include the high water levels along the rivers Meuse and
Rhine in 1993/1995 that triggered the evacuation of over
250,000 people and caused localised flooding (Van
Heezik 2006).
Fluvial and coastal flooding has the highest potential
impacts, in terms of both damages and fatalities. These
flood risks are, however, unevenly distributed geographi-
cally (Klijn et al. 2012: 188). Flood probabilities are higher
in the delta area, i.e. coastal areas in the west and land
bordering the rivers Rhine, Meuse and IJssel. These are
also the areas where the economic impact of flooding
would be highest. Consequently, these coastal and delta
areas are highly protected with around 71% of Dutch pri-
mary flood defences situated here (UvW 2015). Altogether,
primary flood defences protect 55% of the surface area of
the Netherlands and 67% of the population, despite that
only 35% of the population are actually prone to flooding
(De Moel et al. 2011: 623). The so-called unembanked
areas are situated between the source of the flood and a
defence structure, i.e. these are areas at risk which are
unprotected by primary flood defences. Around 115,000
citizens (\1% of the population) reside in unembanked
areas (De Graaf and Van de Veerdonk 2012) which can be
found across the whole country, but are mainly in the delta
areas of Rotterdam and Dordrecht.
The problem of pluvial flooding started to be recognised
in 1998, when large parts of the Netherlands were affected
causing damages of €400 million (Jak and Kok 2000). The
previously low concern about pluvial flooding means that
data about the extent and distribution of pluvial flood risk
are limited (interview: expert urban water management).
However, annually the insurance industry compensates
M. Kaufmann et al.
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approximately €90 million for damages from pluvial
flooding (Verbond van Verzekeraars 2015).
Dutch Flood risk management (FRM)
This section presents the institutional arrangements gov-
erning pre-emptive FRM and post-event recovery for flu-
vial, coastal and pluvial flooding and how these practices
create different distributive justice outcomes. A key dis-
tinction is made between the highly protected areas of the
Netherlands and unembanked areas which receive lower, or
no, governmental flood protection. A second distinction is
the extent to which flood types are treated differently
within Dutch FRM, highlighting where burdens are carried
within a national solidarity arrangement or by individuals.
Fluvial and coastal FRM: who benefits and who
carries the burdens
Pre-emptive FRM: Managing fluvial and coastal flooding
using defence structures
In the Netherlands, FRM is the statutory responsibility of
the state, which is accountable to ensure the habitability of
the country as stipulated in the constitution (Van Rijswick
and Havekes 2012). In other words, the states’ role as
provider of safety, in egalitarian terms, is highly institu-
tionalised. Specialised national and regional governmental
authorities have traditionally constructed, managed and
maintained primary flood defence structures. The Rijk-
swaterstaat, the policy-implementing agency of the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and Environment, and regional water
authorities (established in the Middle Ages and of which
there were 23 in 2015) are principally responsible for
managing coastal and fluvial flood risk. As a consequence
of this long-held high state involvement, citizens’ aware-
ness of flood risk is generally described as low (e.g. OECD,
2014).
Primary flood defences need to fulfil national legal
safety standards of a minimum return interval of up to 1 in
10,000 years along the coast and 1 in 1250 years along
rivers (Van Rijswick and Havekes 2012). These standards
are based on a crude cost–benefit analysis of the econom-
ically most important part of the country (dike ring 14)
undertaken by the first Delta Committee following the
1953 flood disaster (Van Danzig 1956; Van der Most et al.
2010). The results were translated into protection standards
for the primary flood defences and subsequently extrapo-
lated to the rest of the Netherlands (Klijn et al. 2012: 183).
The use of cost–benefit analysis implies a utilitarian
approach to the allocation of protection measures; one
might argue that it was not as purely applied as in other
countries as it was utilised not to select between options,
but to identify protection standards to avoid most damages.
The Delta Programme initiated in 2012 developed new
safety standards. These are based upon the provision of a
minimal safety level for embanked areas, i.e. a mortality
probability of 1 in 100,000 per year. This arrangement
implies an egalitarian justice principle, or to be more
precise, a ‘sufficientarian2’ justice principle: the state
provides a level of protection so that every citizen enjoys a
‘sufficient’ minimum threshold. Societal cost–benefit
analysis compares different management measures (i.e. not
only defences are considered but also, for example, pro-
vision for evacuation) and their benefit to the collective.
These safety standards are used to identify the protection
standards for the primary defences. Safety standards can be
increased in areas with high potential economic damages,
with high population density or where essential infras-
tructure is located (I&M and EZ 2014: 154). Here, the aim
is to ensure highest utility for the majority; thus, in addition
to the egalitarian characteristics, also utilitarian justice
principles are present.
In addition to the ca. 3000 km of primary flood defence
structures, there are also around 14,000 km of regional
flood defences within embanked areas, which provide
protection along smaller watercourses (such as the Mark,
Lek, Dommel), drainage channels, etc. (Van Rijswick and
Havekes 2012). Provinces, in cooperation with regional
water authorities, stipulate land use-based safety standards
for regional defences: for urban areas, the nationally sug-
gested inundation frequency is 1 in 100 years, and for
agricultural areas, it is 1 in 50 years (V&W 1998;
Rijksoverheid et al. 2003). Regional standards are lower
than for primary defences, since the risk (water depth,
velocity, etc.) is generally considered to be lower (STOWA
2004: 10). FRM of this ‘localised’ risk is not institution-
alised on the central level, and standards of protection are
not equalised across the country, even though steps are
undertaken to make the protection more nationally coher-
ent (V&W 1998; UvW and IPO 2004). In this case, a
utilitarian approach to justice is evident, since the norms
are principally based on the economic value of the areas
being protected (compare also Boezeman 2015), but due to
the flexibility afforded, provinces may decide to provide
equal protection standards (e.g. Groningen; see Keessen
et al. 2016).
Resourcing Dutch FRM: Who pays?
When considering the balance of burdens and benefits of
FRM, it is fundamental to analyse resourcing, particularly
2 In practice not all areas have the same standard, but a minimum
one, some will be protected to higher degrees.
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in the context of substantially increasing costs (Penning-
Rowsell and Pardoe 2014). The main investors in fluvial
and coastal FRM are the national government and regional
water authorities. Data indicate that during the period 2001
to 2014, the costs of FRM have nearly tripled. In 2001,
national investments in primary defences were reported to
be ca. €400 million; this increased to €800 million in 2009
(V&W 2010: 55) and to over €1 billion in 2014 (I&M
2015: 98). Investment increases might be attributed to
improvements resulting from the periodical assessment
rounds for primary and regional flood defence structures,
which identified that 20 to 30% of assessed structures did
not fulfil the legally required standards (Inspectie Verkeer
en Waterstaat 2011). Furthermore, in 2012 the Delta Fund
was established to finance proactive climate adaptation
which corresponds to further spending increases (I&M
2015).
In line with the egalitarian understanding of justice, all
taxpaying citizens contribute to fluvial and coastal flood
protection through primary flood defences. In 2014, the
Dutch national income was around 250 billion (Tweede
Kamer 2014); of this, less than 1% (*0.4%) was invested
in FRM. The main contributions, around 89%, were made
by taxpaying households and the rest by businesses
(Twynstra Gudde 2015: 30). Taking an average of 2.2
citizens per household (CBS 2015), an average annual
household contribution was €100. However, tax contribu-
tions vary by income and family situation and, as such,
citizens with a higher economic wealth will contribute
more. Importantly, individual flood probability is not
explicitly considered when calculating national taxpayers’
contributions to FRM, i.e. those at higher risk or defended
to a higher standard do not contribute more. It is also
necessary to consider household characteristics in flood
risk areas. For example, in 2005 the average income in the
highly flood-prone (and protected) western provinces was
8% higher than the national average (CBS 2007). This
means these citizens will have contributed more to the tax
income. Unintentionally, this correlates with their gener-
ally higher flood probability and their higher benefit from
FRM.
Similar to national investments, the contributions of
regional water authorities have also increased in recent
years. In 2015, water authorities spent 37% of their budget
(i.e. €480 million) on flood defences (Dekking 2015: 10) in
comparison with 28% (€268 million) in 2013 (UvW 2014:
44). This almost doubling of FRM spending can be related
to the decentralisation of financing. The costs for mainte-
nance and the operation of primary flood defences are no
longer subsidised by the national government (interview:
regional water authority). Regional water authorities con-
tribute to dike strengthening through the Flood Protection
Programme (HWBP, Hoogwaterbeschermingsprogramma)
which modifies primary flood defences that do not fulfil the
legal safety norms (UvW 2014: 44). It foresees a co-fi-
nancing arrangement consisting of: 50% contribution from
national tax revenues; 40% contribution from the collective
of all regional water authorities (including contributions
from authorities without primary defences, i.e. areas that
will never directly benefit); and 10% contribution from the
specific regional water authority that carries out the FRM
task as a so-called efficiency incentive (UvW et al. 2011).
The contributions of regional water authorities to primary
flood defences are calculated based on the total number of
households and the economic value (indicated through the
WOZ-value3) of an area (Hoeben 2011a: 8). Therefore,
regional water authorities with a high economic capacity
will contribute more to FRM. Importantly, the probability
of flooding or the length of primary defence structures is
not directly considered when calculating each authority’s
contribution to the programme. Therefore, excluding the
10% efficiency incentive, even though there is a trend for
income to be generated more regionally, egalitarian prin-
ciples dominate where costs are spread widely across
regions.
Parallel to the national situation, regional water
authorities generate their income via taxation. The Water
System Tax (watersysteemheffing) partially covers the
maintenance and management costs of primary flood
defences, and nearly the full costs of construction, main-
tenance and management of regional flood defence struc-
tures4 (as well as for other water management tasks). The
exact allocation of taxes for each task remains unclear.
Four categories of taxpaying users are distinguished:
households, i.e. citizens residing in an area; property
owners, i.e. individuals (citizens and businesses) owning a
property; land owners, i.e. mainly farmers or owners of
undeveloped land; and nature conservation organisations
that manage nature areas. The tax contribution is based on
the interest-pay-say principle: the higher the ‘considered’
interest in the management task per category of user, the
higher the financial contribution. Population density is seen
as an indicator to evaluate the ‘interest’ of households,
since in highly urbanised areas, this group benefits most
from the work of the water authority. The remaining costs
are split across the other three users, whose tariff is based
on the economic value of the properties or land, i.e. users
with a higher damage potential contribute more (Hoeben
2011b), yet there is no direct link between the contribution
and flood probability.
3 The WOZ-value is the real estate value defined annually by the
municipality.
4 The province is also marginally contributing to FRM; however, this
is not further elaborated in this paper.
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Between regions, the exact contributions differ per cat-
egory of user. In 2014, property owners (49%) and
households (39%) contribute on average proportionally
more than land owners (11%) and nature managers (1%)
(I&M 2015: 98). The rationale behind this distribution is
complex, and several reasons have been proposed. Regio-
nal water authorities and farmer interest groups argue it is
because urban water management has increased due to
ongoing urbanisation and costs are primarily allocated to
households as they are seen to benefit most (interview:
regional water authority). Other actors, such as citizen
interest groups, stress the influence of farmer interest
groups in lobbying for greater cross-subsidisation from
households to prevent their costs increasing (interview:
researcher). Either way, the average annual increase in
costs for households from 1998 to 2010 was 7%, for
property owners 5.5% from 2000 to 2010, and for land
owners, the tariff decreased annually by 0.1% from 1998 to
2010 (Hoeben 2010: 105f). From 2014 to 2015, the average
increase in tariffs was: 3.3% for households, 3.4% for
property owners and 3.1% for land owners (Allers et al.
2015: 13). Thus, different social categories are treated
differently, whereby the differences in contributions cannot
explicitly be linked to the flood risk.
Adding to these distributional effects are the differences
evident between regional water authorities. These differ-
ences do reflect, to some degree, the probability of flooding
for collective groups. Households and property owners in
the west, with a higher probability of flooding, pay a higher
tariff than in the east, with a lower probability. In the east,
the average costs to households for flood and water man-
agement was around €50/per year in 2015, with property
owners (average property value of €211,000) paying an
additional ca. €60. In the West, these values are approxi-
mately one-third to one-half higher (dataset from COELO).
That implies that citizens in areas with a higher flood
probability do contribute slightly more to financing FRM,
which aligns to some degree with a beneficiary pays
understanding. But this is at a collective level, rather than
the direct relation of tariffs to individual flood risk
probabilities.
Post-event recovery
Comparatively, recovery from fluvial and coastal flooding
in the Netherlands is considered to be secondary to the high
prevention focus. In 1998, the Calamities Compensation
Act (CCA, Wet tegemoetkoming schade bij rampen en
zware ongevallen) was set up to provide post-event com-
pensation. It is solidarity based and aligns to egalitarian or
Rawlsian maximin rule principles. The act is mainly
applicable for compensation of damages from freshwater
flooding in embanked areas, when an event is declared a
disaster, and when no other compensation (e.g. liability) or
insurance is available. This implies that citizens affected by
coastal (saltwater) flooding, pluvial flooding or citizens
living in unembanked areas should not (formally) receive
equal governmental support for recovery as citizens
affected by fluvial flooding. Therefore, those not covered
would be individually responsible for their recovery,
implying an elitist justice principle (i.e. those outcomes
will be better for those who are wealthier or who can afford
to access insurance products via the market (libertarian)).
However, the lack of widely available coastal and fluvial
flood insurance (at affordable prices) limits the ability of
households to access market mechanisms and reinforces
elitist flood recovery outcomes. Furthermore, the govern-
ment is known to provide compensation in cases where the
Act is not applicable, especially for coastal flooding and in
unembanked areas (Van Vliet and Aerts, 2014). Accord-
ingly, there is criticism of the government for being
ambiguous and creating outcomes based on political will
(Botzen and Van den Bergh 2008). This uncertainty creates
the potential for those affected by flooding in different
circumstances to be treated unequally and leads to different
distributive justice outcomes.
Unembanked areas: the neglected few
‘Unembanked areas’ are generally excluded from main-
stream FRM approaches. Citizens in these areas lack the
same opportunities of governmental protection or recovery
from fluvial and coastal flooding as citizens residing in
embanked areas. However, since the National Delta Pro-
gramme (2012), more attention is being paid to these areas,
for example in Dordrecht, to explore possibilities for flood
risk adaptation strategies (I&M and EZ 2014). Even though
the probability of flooding in unembanked areas has
increased in recent years, the flood risk is generally lower
often due to higher elevation (Koks et al. 2015). Citizens in
unembanked areas principally have to manage flood risk
autonomously and, to do so, need to be aware of flood risks
and capable of undertaking measures. In general, regula-
tions do not prevent citizens adapting to flooding as long as
measures do not influence discharge capacities; however,
incentives for measures are not provided (Van Vliet 2012).
Information campaigns to increase citizen risk awareness
differ from municipality to municipality leading to high
variability of awareness (De Boer et al. 2012).
Even when informed, though, citizens need to be
financially able to invest in necessary adaptations. Koks
et al. (2015) highlighted that 20% of the inhabitants of
unembanked areas in the greater Rotterdam area are con-
sidered to be socially vulnerable households, potentially
limiting their ability to either adapt to flood risk or to move.
Subsidies for private flood-proofing measures to enable
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deprived households to undertake measures are not sys-
tematically provided. This individual responsibility sug-
gests a more elitist approach. Furthermore, although
around half of regional water authorities offer citizens in
unembanked areas a tax reduction (interview: regional
water authority), those residing in unembanked areas still
contribute to FRM via national and local taxation. It is not
true to suggest, however, that those who reside in unem-
banked areas do not benefit at all from the existence of
primary flood defences, but their benefits will be less
direct. These residents, for instance, may work in
embanked areas or they may benefit from critical infras-
tructure that is located there. Additionally, they will also
benefit from the national economic security afforded by the
high flood protection.
Managing pluvial flooding: a burden
of the individual?
Pre-emptive pluvial FRM
Pluvial FRM falls largely on the individual. From 2008
onwards, municipalities have a ‘duty of care’ to collect and
transport rainwater in public areas. However, importantly,
no legal safety standards are nationally prescribed (Gilissen
2013) although technical guidelines foresee, as a rule of
thumb, that a sewer has a capacity to flood the street once
every two years (Rioned 2006). Municipalities and pro-
vinces have discretionary powers to develop and imple-
ment management measures for pluvial flooding (Mols and
Schut 2012). The management of pluvial flooding can
therefore differ between municipalities (ibid).
Resourcing pluvial FRM
Pluvial flooding is financed locally, without any regional
redistribution (Kunst 2015). The collection and transport of
waste water and urban rainwater is financed via the
Municipal Sewer Tax (rioolheffing). The taxes are mainly
generated by households (92%) and to a smaller degree by
companies (8%) (Twynstra Gudde 2015) although the
specific tariff charged differs between municipalities.
Generally, it is a fixed amount for single- or multiple-
person households paid by the user or property owner. In
some cases, however, the economic value is also consid-
ered or it is based on the amount of water consumed.
Multiple-person households pay on average €189 (range of
€79–€375) for municipal Sewer Taxes (Allers et al. 2015).
In recent years, the average tax for households has
increased above the level of inflation due to new environ-
mental regulations and the renewal of sewer systems
(Allers et al. 2015). The proportion of the tax invested in
pluvial FRM differs between municipalities but averages at
about one-third (Kunst, 2015: 4). Therefore, across the 393
Dutch municipalities this equated in 2014 to investments of
€280 million (excluding VAT) or €20 per inhabitant (Kunst
2015: 4, 15).
Managing this type of flooding is clearly a more indi-
vidual responsibility and is decided at a municipal level.
Consequently, the justice outcomes may be highly variable
with those cases a municipality prioritises (perhaps based
on where the greatest benefit lies: i.e. a utilitarian
approach) benefitting greatly and the cases which are not
considered residing with the individual, favouring those
who are most able to take action (elitist justice outcomes).
Post-event recovery
Since 1999, insurance for damages from precipitation has
been included as part of household (contents and property)
insurance. Governmental compensation is formally not
foreseen, which implies a more elitist and libertarian
understanding of justice with the individual responsible for
purchasing compensation via the private market. Having
insurance coverage is often a pre-requisite for having a
mortgage, and Spekkers et al. (2013) contend that the
market penetration for private insurance is high. However,
damage due to rainwater entering the ground floor (e.g.
pluvial flooding) requires a supplement. The market pen-
etration rate for this supplement is unknown, as is the
average premium cost (interview: Dutch Association of
Insurers). In general, premiums are not considered to be
risk based due to the bundled nature of the insurance and
rainfall-generated damages being only one, often minor,
peril covered by the insurance (ibid).
Table 2 summarises the different distributive justice
outcomes generated by the institutional arrangements
responsible for FRM. It highlights a disparity in how
flood risk is managed which varies considerable by flood
type and location. Reasons for these differences are
explored below, before the potential consequences of
these different justice outcomes for the future are dis-
cussed in Sect. 7.
Discourses of FRM in the Netherlands:
the undebated issue of justice
A dichotomy is observed in the Dutch FRM approach. The
institutional arrangement is characterised by a wide set of
regulations that allocate many resources (over €1 billion
annually) to the management of (especially fluvial/coastal)
flood risk. However, there is hardly any public debate at the
national level regarding this distribution. Notions of justice
were rarely explicitly discussed during the interviews or in
policy documents. This section explores the underlying
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discourses on justice and assesses whether they correspond
with the different distributive justice outcomes.
A foundation of Dutch FRM is that coastal and fluvial
flooding is considered an existential threat potentially dis-
ruptive to the whole of society. Following the storm surge
of 1953, the decision was made that something similar
should ‘never’ be allowed to happen again (interviews:
national and regional water managers), indicating the very
low acceptability of flooding. But these views go even
further. The saying ‘the dikes make up the state’ (Elzinga
et al. 2006: 171) illustrates that protection from flooding is
conceived as a very foundation of the Dutch state. This, in
egalitarian terms, provides the state with its legitimacy
founded on the notion that it ensures the flood safety of its
citizens. Sloterdijk (1998) would label this foundation of
Dutch society as the immunisation against the apocalyptic
risk of flooding. This makes protection against coastal and
fluvial flooding a basic human right and flood defence
structures a collective good, essential to maintaining the
existence of the Netherlands (interview: Ministry I&M).
This protectionist discourse and the low acceptability of
fluvial and coastal flood risk indicate why the focus is on
pre-emptive FRM at the relative neglect of post-event
recovery.
Table 2 Summary of the distributive justice outcomes of the Dutch institutions responsible for flood risk management
Type of
flooding
Coastal and fluvial flooding Pluvial flooding
Embanked areas Unembanked areas
Primary flood defences Secondary flood defences
Pre-emptive
flood risk
management
A mix between egalitarian
(sufficientarian) and
utilitarian justice outcomes
A minimum basic safety level
is a constitutional state
responsibility—reinforcing
notions of solidarity and
egalitarian principles.
However, differentiated
protection standards exist
based roughly on the
principles of CBA
(utilitarian). In general,
areas with higher coastal
risk have higher protection
standards for dikes (up to
1:10,000) than those with
fluvial flood risk
FRM funding—generally
from taxation. For national
taxes, this shows principally
an egalitarian approach
where all pay to reduce the
burdens of flood risk.
However, for regional taxes
(there is a degree of
differentiation based on
both interests and property
values), therefore, this has
utilitarian tendencies
Generally an utilitarian-
based justice outcome,
however, the province can
also adopt a more
egalitarian approach
(example Groningen)
The provinces stipulate
protection levels, generally
dependent on the economic
value behind embankments
Elitist (Libertarian) justice
outcomes
A lack of governmental
involvement and assistance
necessitates households in
unembanked areas to take
individual responsibility for
their own flood risks and
therefore based on
individual resources
Importantly, no governmental
funding is provided to these
individuals; however, they
do contribute (via taxation)
to FRM in the embanked
areas
Mixed justice outcomes
depending upon the actions
of individual municipalities
FRM for pluvial flooding is,
often, an individual
responsibility (elitist—i.e.
those who can afford to pay
for measures)
Some municipalities use local
taxes to manage pluvial
flooding leading to mixed
(usually) utilitarian or
Rawlsian maximin rule
outcomes depending upon
management decisions
Utilitarian—the municipality
takes action where there is
most benefit
Rawlsian maximin rule—the
municipality takes action to
manage the risk to
vulnerable groups (i.e. those
least able to help
themselves)
Post-event
recovery
Egalitarian justice outcomes
Fluvial flooding falls under the remit of the CCA, and
therefore, the state will provide financial compensation
following fluvial flooding (egalitarian). Coastal flooding is
formally excluded by the CCA, and therefore, those affected
bear the burden for recovery (elitist) as generally insurance
is not available or affordable. However, the state may step-
in and provide assistance for at least the most vulnerable in
society (egalitarian/Rawlsian maximin rule)
Elitist justice outcomes
Not included within the CCA
and so a lack of guaranteed
financial compensation
The government may offer ad
hoc assistance (in particular,
for vulnerable groups)
leading to egalitarian or
Rawlsian maximin rule
outcomes
Elitist (libertarian) justice
outcomes
No government compensation
is provided. Citizens are
individually responsible for
purchasing private market
insurance. Therefore,
outcomes are dependent on
individual resources
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This conception of flood risk is connected to an egali-
tarian perspective on justice. Interviewees stated that those
at risk have the same right to safety as those located in
areas less susceptible to fluvial and coastal flooding: those
at risk should not be disadvantaged because they live in
flood-prone areas as it is not considered to be their fault.
This discourse is reinforced in discussions surrounding the
new safety norms. It was stated that ‘A human life is worth
the same everywhere and the probability of fatality due to
flooding must therefore everywhere be fixed at a basic
level’ (Deltacommissie 2008: 42). The unequal distribution
of flood risk is supposed to be counteracted through FRM.
Solidarity is justified by the aim to achieve equal oppor-
tunity. Although egalitarian principles dominate FRM,
other distributive justice principles have been observed
particularly in differences between the west and the east. A
number of interviewees stated that citizens in the east are
benefiting greatly from industry in the west. As one inter-
viewee put it ‘it is rather silly that they can live happily on
their sand mountain and the money is earned in the west
where they risk drowning’ (interview: Ministry I&M). As
such, those areas that have higher economic value are
provided extra protection illustrating a utilitarian perspec-
tive of justice.
This protectionist discourse of solidarity for flooding
from the main water courses is characterised by a high
consensus. On the one hand, over the decades, the trau-
matic event of 1953 was retained in the Dutch collective
memory. Even younger generations grew up understand-
ing these ‘memories’, e.g. the contrast between new and
old buildings in the affected villages, or the dates on the
graveyards with many fatalities from 1953 (interview:
Ministry I&M). History was constantly reproduced. This
transmission of beliefs is contributing to the naturalisation
of discourses and the stability of the FRM institutional
arrangement (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). The naturalisa-
tion of a discourse means that actors start to take par-
ticular discourses for granted, while alternative discourses
become less accepted. Various governments accept this
discourse although it aligns differently with their respec-
tive political ideologies: Socialist governments see
themselves as protector of the citizens and therefore do
not challenge this idea, whereas more liberal parties see
flood protection as a necessity for economic growth and
as an export product in its own right. Additionally with
increasing governmental responsibility and limited flood
experience, the awareness of flood risk among Dutch
citizens decreased (OECD 2014). Nowadays, Dutch citi-
zens expect the government to manage the risk, which
limits their willingness to challenge it. Consequently,
political, societal and scientific debate about justice in
FRM tends to be limited. All justice discourse became
silent (Foucault 1978: 27).
Despite the high consensus and naturalisation of a pro-
tectionist approach to FRM, this is not the same for all
areas or all flood types; there are clear inequalities in how
some individuals and communities at risk of flooding are
treated. Egalitarian justice principles are limited to
embanked areas. Residents in unembanked areas are con-
sidered to ‘choose on their own to live outside the dike’
(interviews: national and regional policy makers). In con-
trast, residents in the embanked areas are not considered to
be ‘at fault’, which coincides with a choice sensitive dis-
course, and therefore, they should be individually respon-
sible for the burden of FRM. The notion of choice and fault
clarifies the different justice outcomes (embanked/unem-
banked) generated by the institutions, despite vulnerable
households being exposed (Koks et al. 2015).
Likewise, discourses and debates underlying pluvial
FRM are different. Local and national governmental
authorities view pluvial flooding as a minor problem—a
nuisance—that citizens have the capability and responsi-
bility to manage themselves (Rijksoverheid et al. 2003;
interviews: Water department of municipalities). Recently,
pluvial flooding has received more political attention,
mainly at the regional and local level (interviews: Munic-
ipalities). A survey of Dutch municipalities revealed that
84% regard pluvial flooding as their most urgent climate-
related problem (Wielinga et al. 2015: 29). However, the
tolerance of pluvial flooding among municipalities remains
higher than for coastal and fluvial flooding (Wielinga et al.
2015: 24; interviews: Municipalities). These differing
conceptions of pluvial flooding correspond with the diverse
justice outcomes originating from institutional
arrangements.
Whereas the discourse on fluvial and coastal flooding
became undebated and developed into a ‘silent discourse’
that was naturalised and taken for granted, the justice
discourses of pluvial flooding tend to stay largely unde-
bated because pluvial flooding is only slowly starting to
emerge as a risk of social relevance. Based on theoretical
understandings of Foucault (1978), i.e. that discourses
embody power by influencing what receives people’s
attention and what stays largely ignored, in this sense,
constructing coastal and fluvial flooding as an apocalyptic
risk could have contributed to the limited attention paid to
other, less deadly or apocalyptic, types of flood risk.
Conclusion and implications
In general, the existing Dutch system of FRM works
effectively and ensures a high level of safety from fluvial
and coastal flooding (Klijn et al. 2012: 189). While this
system has an abundance of rules, regulations and resour-
ces, debates about justice are lacking. The current
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institutional arrangement has material outcomes that treat
particular groups of citizens differently, depending on the
type of flooding they are prone to, area they live in
(unembanked/embanked) or category of user they belong
to (e.g. household, industry, farmer). Accordingly, three
individual households with similar flood risk characteris-
tics, in terms of potential probabilities, expected velocities
and depths and likely damages, may pay similar financial
contributions to FRM, but receive very different outcomes
in terms of both pre-emptive FRM and post-event recovery.
The access to state-provided FRM differs considerably
between citizens prone to coastal/fluvial and pluvial
flooding or living in unembanked areas. The latter have
few opportunities to seek the enforcement of FRM mea-
sures from municipalities, whereas the national govern-
ment is directly accountable for fluvial/coastal risks.
Although the governmental focus on high flood risks is
understandable, this may be of little comfort for individuals
who have to privately fund their own FRM measures or
who suffer the damage and distress caused by flooding and
have to finance their own recovery. Especially deprived
households, who cannot afford insurance or private FRM
measures, are likely to be disadvantaged, thereby increas-
ing existing inequalities, as demonstrated by a study of
Penning-Rowsell and Priest (2014: 1006) for the English
case.
The debate on justice in FRM is likely to (re)emerge, since
the differences in distributional outcomes will become more
uneven due to increasing flood risk from climate change,
urbanisation and higher economic value (Klijn et al. 2012;
KNMI 2015). Maintaining current levels of safety under
these conditions means increasing costs for all citizens,
either in terms of taxation contribution or private invest-
ments in pre-emptive or post-event recovery measures. To
some degree, this cost increase for preventing fluvial/coastal
flooding is already partly anticipated by the Delta Fund
(I&M and EZ 2014). However, due to the high uncertainty,
extra investments in the future cannot be excluded, espe-
cially considering the ongoing economic development in the
flood-prone west (Klijn et al. 2012). Therefore, debates on
justice, including where and whom to defend, are likely to
emerge, as was the case in England (Johnson et al. 2008), in
particular when disparities between expected and affordable
protection levels become more obvious.
Potential future debates could include (1) the extension
of the national solidarity to all types of flooding and all
areas, (2) the withdrawal from national solidarity, or (3) an
adaptation of the financial contributions from different
groups of users. The extension of the solidarity-based
approach might be discussed, if pluvial flooding develops
from a local nuisance to a national risk or when citizens in
unembanked areas start to be conceived, not as having
chosen to live there, but as vulnerable groups (as implied
by Koks et al. 2015) that might have been unaware of the
risk due to insufficient information (as implied by De Boer
et al. 2012). It also might be difficult to sell their land/
properties in these areas and move into protected areas,
especially for socially deprived households. Conversely, a
withdrawal from governmental solidarity could be dis-
cussed. The increasing burden on citizens (particularly
those only indirectly benefitting from FRM) might lead to a
challenge of the appropriateness of maintaining high safety
standards through solidarity-based financing. This could be
accompanied by a discussion about a more developed
private insurance system, considering that the current
governmental recovery arrangement is poorly institution-
alised (Botzen and Van den Bergh 2008). While this could
facilitate economic development in less-flood-prone areas,
it might also increase the financial burden for individuals at
risk of flooding. Already, the shift from a national to the
more regionalised financing structure (e.g. Flood Protection
Programme) is projected to cause problems for those
regional water authorities (e.g. Zeeland) with many pri-
mary flood defences, but which have a lower economic
capacity and population density, thereby placing more
burdens on flood-prone citizens (Mostert and Doorn 2012).
Another discussion might emerge surrounding the distri-
bution of financial contributions of different households
and users. These different contributions at national and
regional levels are not always based on intentional and
explicit justice rationales that consider the differences in
capacities or FRM benefits received.
To be prepared for this debate, it is necessary to have the
relevant facts and figures concerning the numbers of citi-
zens/households at risk of different types of flooding, their
exposures (e.g. water level, velocity), the flood probability,
damage potential and (social) vulnerability, as well as
market penetration of insurance. Currently, these data are
partially lacking. An inclusive public and political debate
that allows room to discuss different burdens of FRM and
their distribution could strengthen the public support and
awareness for flood risk, contributing to more effective and
legitimate FRM.
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